Exile on Arab Street

I´ve moved to wordpress!

2010-03-25T08:02:00.000-07:00

My new address is exileonarabstreet.wordpress.com

Et vendepunkt for Iran

2009-08-11T07:10:00.000-07:00

På tross av avtagende uro varsler hendelsene i etterkant av valget i juni om et vendepunkt for det iranske regimet.

De fleste har fått med seg den siste tidens demonstasjoner, som har vært av en størrelse og et omfang som bare kan sammenliknes med uroen under revolusjonen i 1979.[1] Men myndighetene slo ned på demonstrantene med hard hånd, og Iran er tilsynelatende tilbake til det normale.

Sannhetens øyeblikk
Under et folkeopprør kommer man til et punkt som kan kalles sannhetens øyeblikk: Hvem kontrollerer militæret? Og vil militæret virkelig skyte på sivile, skyte på folkemengder av sine egne landsmenn?

Det hender at militæret bytter side. Med Revolusjonsgarden – en egen elitestyrke ansett for å være mer regimetro enn de regulære væpnede styrkene – er dessverre ikke dette noe realistisk scenario. For tredve år siden var Shahens soldater villige til å begynne med villige til å skyte sivile iranere. Den gangen spilte ikke dette noen rolle; demonstrasjonene fortsatte på tross av myndighetenes voldsbruk. Til slutt måtte Shahen gi opp og sette seg på flyet.

Når folket ikke lenger frykter rå voldsmakt er det lite en diktator kan gjøre. Skal det samme hende igjen i 2009? Det ser ikke slik ut. På tross av at reformkandidatene Mousavi og Karroubi oppfordrer til fortsatt motstand, maner andre reformpolitikere – som tidligere president Khatami – til ro og orden. Tjue mennesker er drept, og minst tusen er arrestert. På tv står demonstranter frem og innrømmer på Moskva-aktig vis at de ble forledet til forræderske protester av utenlandske aktører som journalister og ambassade-ansatte.

les mer på :
http://www.minerva.as/?vis=artikkel&fid=3017&id=220720090758441707&magasin=ja&t=Et-vendepunkt-for-Iran

Demokratisk Islamisme i Iran

2009-05-17T10:23:00.000-07:00

INTERVJU: – Ahmadinejads presidentskap er totalt mislykket, og de iranske reformkreftene er i fremgang. Men Vesten må holde seg unna, mener Yadallah Shahibzade, forsker ved Universitetet i Oslo, i intervju med Minerva. les mer her: http://www.minerva.as/?vis=artikkel&fid=3017&id=1404200907393723965&magasin=ja

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom of Religion or Belief

2009-01-02T09:05:00.000-08:00

My master thesis is now published! Visit Amazon.com to order. Below follows a short summary of the book.
Islamist movements like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are increasingly embracing democratic principles. Therefore, an exploration of their support of the underlying values of democracy is crucial in order to understand what democracy actually means to these actors. However, Islamists do not operate in a political vacuum. In the Egyptian context, one must consider the effects of long-term authoritarian rule. More importantly, one must consider the Egyptian regime´s political reliance on, and manipulation of, conservative Islam. This reliance render the Egyptian regime unable to completely reject critique against it regarding Islam and the protection of Islamic values. The result has been the creation of an illiberal religious discourse which functions as Brotherhood´s main, if not only, channel of influence.

Generation kill and House of Saddam

2008-10-01T04:52:00.000-07:00

Generation Kill is the new HBO-series based on Rolling Stone's reporter Evan Wright's articles and book. Wright was embedded with the Marines of First Recon Battalion, following the initial phase of the Iraqi invasion as the First Recon made its way from Kuwait, through Basra, and finally into Baghdad.

I'm usually not a big fan of contemporary war movies and series. Seen the movie "Jar Head" from the first Gulf war? The movie is a collection of pieced-together music videos, where almost every scene is accompanied by some soundtrack picked out to make the marines "look cool", or war look "meaningless" or "brutal" in the eyes of the viewer.

This is not true of Generation Kill. Throughout six of seven episodes, the only music heard are the tunes sung by the soldiers themselves while driving their Humvees, plus some Arabic pop music played in the streets by locals. The final episode features an original Johnny Cash track. This small but significant fact sets the standard for the whole series, as it is the dialogue and characters that carry the weight here. The whole thing feels authentic and nuanced.

But be warned; Generation Kill will anger and vex you in the extreme. Is it possible to make more mistakes when invading a country? There are good Marines and bad Marines. There are even Marines who are brilliant (like Sgt. Brad Colbert). Unluckily, it's the bad, even psychopathic and incompetent, who are in charge of this war.

This is proven by the almost surreal mismanagement of Saddam city, the Shiite district who now goes by the name of Sadr city (named after the dead Shiite leader Muhammad Sadiq al Sadr). Having finally reached Baghdad, First Recon is put in charge of securing and patrolling Saddam city. This part of town is plagued with looting, nighttime robberies and vigilante executions. In addition, the supply of clean water and electricity is below insufficient. The Marines of First Recon, some of whom genuinely want to help the inhabitants of Saddam city, are constantly relocated from neighborhood to neighborhood. They are not allowed to return to the neighborhood they visited and made promises to the day before.They are not allowed to do night patrols to stop the nighttime attacks on Iraqi citizens. They cannot perform the simple task of handing out clean water to the Iraqis. Bear in mind that the battalion has carried out the whole invasion with only one interpreter, a highly unprofessional one at that. Further more, at least according to Wright's book, knowledge generated from speaking to locals and operating "on the ground" is not allowed to move upwards in the chain of command; the commanding officers show a persistent disregard for insight offered by lower officers or other personnel. And we all know how Saddam city turned out.

In short, the seven episodes make up a seven-hour long cabaret of unbelievable, inconceivable stupidity. Nonetheless, the series offers the satisfaction of seeing offending Marines "named and shamed". I personally hope Captains Dave McGraw and Craig Schewtje are watching.

HBO and BBC’s joint venture, the four-episode long "House of Saddam", is a bit more disappointing. We follow Saddam from 1979, when he became president of Iraq, and until he is hanged in 2006. Despite being entertaining, the show is superficial and not least biased with regard to which events are included and excluded. The episode about the 1991 Gulf war elegantly skips the aftermath: how the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north, after repeated Western encouragement in various forms, rebelled against Saddam, expecting Western support. None came, and Saddam’s retaliation was swift and brutal. To fail to mention this deceit in a series about Saddam is downright disrespectful toward the people that actually tried to get rid of him a decade before the US decided it was time. Also, the show is superficial because of its extremely narrow focus. Make it ten episodes instead of four, and include what went on in Iraq besides Uday and Qusay’s crime ventures or Saddam’s love life, and maybe the series could have been more watch-worthy. While I’m not sure that this show was created merely for propagandist purposes, I can’t really think why it was created. Although mildly entertaining, it’s not that entertaining. So, be advised: go for Generation Kill this season.

Nablus 2008

2008-09-29T05:51:00.000-07:00

The old part of Nablus is exceedingly appealing to any Westerner searching for the "unspoiled" and "authentic" Middle East. Circled by mountains, its narrow, winding streets and buildings from the Ottoman era make Nablus into one of the more picturesque Middle Eastern cities (of which many are surprisingly ugly). There are no tourists here to take pictures or buy souvenirs. To some, this might be one of Nablus' great attractions. It may be a tragedy for some locals. Since the Second Intifada, Nablus has experienced long periods of curfews, army crackdowns and endless lines to get out of the city's checkpoint. Throughout the city one can observe the inhabitants' response: the walls and gates of Nablus are filled with posters honoring various martyrs/suicide bombers. Caught in a seemingly endless circle of action-reaction between Israelis and Palestinians, the result is a town where a decent livelihood is difficult to sustain.

The Lonely Planet guide recommends the Selim Affendi restaurant. Hungry and hopeful, we set out in search of this Selim Affendi. As it turns out, the restaurant was built, but never opened. The owner shows us the exotic interior of low tables and pillows, Moroccan style, which was never to see any customers. What happened? The Intifada happened, with the subsequent Israeli reaction. And Nablus has seen a lot of action in this regard. Few dare to risk any business ventures, for fear of new curfews and further isolation of the town. Because the obstacles put in place by Israel are hard to get around, export of olive oil is near impossible. When driving into Nablus, one passes miles and miles of olive orchards. Inside Nablus, the oil from these orchards is sold in old cola bottles from small stands in the local bazaar.

The situation in Nablus is endemic in the entire West Bank (except maybe Ramallah). Despite the downsides associated with excessive tourism (Egypt being the case in point), there is no doubt that the Palestinian economy would benefit from even a moderate trickle of tourists. The political situation scares away everyone but the most devoted traveler, and even these are hard to come by in places such as Nablus, Jenin or Jericho. Palestine has a lot to offer a tourist. It has the natural beauty, the historical sites, the food and the culture to satisfy everyone from backpackers and middle class couples to the biblical tour groups, all of whom are even now flocking to Israel and Jordan. As such, I would encourage everyone to travel to Palestine. See for yourself what’s going on. And make sure to spend some money while you’re there.

Islamister blir manipulert

2008-03-24T10:05:00.000-07:00

Ettersom stadig flere islamistiske partier slutter seg til demokratiske prinsipper, har en oppnådd en gradvis erkjennelse av at disse partiene kan være Midtøstens største håp når det gjelder å fri seg fra udemokratiske styresett. Samtidig vet vi lite om hvordan demokratiet under islamistisk styre ville fortont seg. Et svært viktig aspekt i denne debatten har blitt lite berørt. Dette aspektet dreier seg om hvordan islamistene selv blir manipulert av regjeringene i sine land til å fremme verdikonservativ politikk. Denne politikken bidrar i sin ytterste konsekvens til et klima som er lite egnet til demokratisk utvikling, hverken av staten eller islam.

La oss bruke det Muslimske Brorskap i Egypt som eksempel. Denne gruppen er den eldste, største og viktigste blant de islamistiske organisasjonene. Partier som Hamas og det jordanske Islamic Action Front er direkte avgreninger herfra, og brødrenes fatwaer og politiske uttalelser har innflytelse langt utover Egypts grenser. Samtidig er Muslimbrødrene utrettelige forkjempere for et mer demokratisk Egypt. Desverre er det faktorer som tyder på at enkelte demokratiske prinsipper, som for eksempel religionsfrihet eller ytringsfrihet, er mangelfullt integrert i brorskapets politiske agenda. Det Muslimske brorskap er blant annet svært aktive når det gjelder å nekte tilhengerne av bahai-religionen rettigheter på lik linje med andre egyptere. Brødrene var heller ikke snare om å kreve kulturminister Hosni Faruqs avgang etter at han uttalte seg negativt om bruken av det islamske hodesløret.

Men brorskapets politikk oppstår ikke i et vakuum: deres valgmuligheter er i stor grad determinert av det egyptiske regimet. Dette regimet, med president Hosni Mubarak i spissen, oppmuntrer og belønner det Muslimske brorskap når brødrene forsøker å sensurere den offentlige debatten i forhold til islam og islamske verdier. Dette gjøres ved at de mest konservative og illiberale fraksjonene innenfor bevegelsen tillates stor plass i det offentlige rom, hvorfra de øver en relativt stor innflytelse over statlig politikk. De stemmene som fordrer til moderasjon og toleranse, eller stiller krav om demokratiske reformer, blir ignorert eller undertrykket. En av årsakene til dette er at Mubarak har satt seg i en posisjon der han er ute av stand til avvise religiøs kritikk, ettersom han fremstiller seg selv som religionens beskytter, og Egypt som en islamsk nasjon og lederstjerne. Dermed er Mubarak nødt til å etterkomme mange av brødrenes krav når det gjelder beskyttelse av islamske verdier. Regimets mangel på demokratisk kredibilitet, samt manglende økonomisk utvikling, gjør at islam har blitt ett av de viktigste verktøy for å beholde noen grad av legitimitet hos den religiøst orienterte delen av befolkningen. Dermed er også forholdet til islamistene preget av en stram balansegang mellom manipulasjon og undertrykkelse.

Det finnes en “rød linje” Muslimbrødrene ikke må krysse. Denne linjen dreier seg om å ikke utfordre regimet for direkte. Det vil si at for mye fokus på demokratiske reformer fra brødrenes side, blir oppfattet som en direkte utfordring mot Mubarak. Krav om demokratiske reformer er ikke bare resultatløst, men også svært risikabelt. Ofte ender disse kampene i en ny arrestasjonsrunde for medlemmene av den vanligvis tolererte organisasjonen. I den kulturelle sfære har Muslimbrødrene og andre konservative muslimer derimot stor innflytelse. Det er vanlig at det Muslimske brorskap og den statskontrollerte islamske institusjonen al Azhar står sammen i rollen som religionen og moralens voktere. Deres krav om økt statlig og rettslig beskyttelse av islam blir som regel etterkommet; rettsalene er et eksempel på en arena hvor staten og det Muslimske brorskaps interesser faller sammen. I følge enkelte har denne makten kommet så langt at det er snakk om en atmosfære av “intellektuell terrorisme”, hvor intellektuelle og kunstnere blir stilt for retten, boikottet eller bannlyst dersom de stiller spørsmål ved islamsk praksis, eller går utover det som regnes for de moralske grensene. Dette er altså en arena hvor brorskapet har mulighet til å øve forholdsvis stor innflytelse over egyptisk politikk, og det er også et område som er mindre “farlig” å befatte seg med enn demokratiske reformer. På denne måten blir islamistene oppmuntret til å fokusere på sensur av forfattere og bannlysning av bøker fremfor bekjempelsen av diktaturet. Dette styrker de konservative elementene innenfor bevegelsen; det er deres stemmer som blir hørt og etterfulgt.

Et annet viktig moment her, er at Mubarak også tjener enormt på at Muslimbrødrene fremstår som religiøse fanatikere. Den sekulære middelklassens frykt for et religiøst regime, er et faktum som holder ikke-demokratiske regimer ved makten over hele Midtøsten. På tross av at denne middelklassen ønsker en slutt på autokratiet, er tanken på alternativet—et teokrati `ala Iran—enda verre. Mubarak og hans kolleger i landene rundt fremstiller seg selv som det eneste som står mellom middelklassen og et religiøst fanatisk regime. Dette får sekulære “demokrater” til å velge diktaturet, gang på gang.

Beklageligvis er vesten en del av dette problemet. Diktatoren kan bare trekke frem den overhengende faren for et islamistisk “take-over” for å stilne krav om demokratiske reformer fra vestlig hold. På samme måte som middelklassen, frykter også vesten et fiendtlig innstilt teokrati, og også de velger det undertrykkende, men dog vestlig-innstilte, regimet. Tankegangen fra den kalde krigens dager om at “he may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch” lever fremdeles i beste velgående når det gjelder vestens støtte til autokrater i midtøsten.

Styrkelsen og oppmuntringen av de illiberale trekkene hos islamistene bidrar også til at den demokratiske opposisjonen er ute av stand til å forene seg mot en felles fiende. Polariseringen mellom den sekulære siden og den islamistiske er på grensen til en “ideologisk borgerkrig”. Dette passer selvsagt Mubarak utmerket, og er nok også årsaken til at det nye partiet “al Wasat” blir nektet partiløyve. Al Wasat betyr “sentrum” eller “midten”, og består av unge tidligere medlemmer av det Muslimske brorskap og representanter for egyptiske kristne (koptere). Mange observatører både inn -og utenlands håpet at dette partiet skulle lykkes i å forene den egyptiske opposisjonen med sin religiøst inkluderende og demokratiske plattform. Desverre har Mubarak, gjennom lovgivning, trusler og arrestasjoner, lykkes i å forhindre al Wasat fra å etablere seg som en sterk grasrot-bevegelse.

Al Wasat stod i fare for å representere et mer liberalt og åpent islam, et islam som kunne vist seg å være akseptabelt for selv den sekulære middelklassen. Dette kunne i så fall vist seg å være ett skritt videre i demokratiseringen av Egypt. Samtidig ville det også kunne bety et skritt videre i utviklingen av islam. Ettersom midtøsten i stor grad er definert av islam, også politisk sett, ville det alternativet al Wasat representerte brakt oss nærmere en demokratisering av hele regionen. Hosni Mubarak er derimot ikke opptatt av å styrke liberaliseringen av islam, hverken innen det Muslimske brorskap eller hos andre aktører. Ved å oppmuntre islamistenes illiberale trekk, får han dem til å fremstå som uakseptable for både sekulære i Egypt og for vestlige regjeringer. Vil vesten bidra til en forandring i midtøsten, bør en snarest mulig opprette offisiell kontakt med det Muslimske brorskap og al Wasat, samt deres kolleger i andre land. Slik kan de allerede eksisterende liberale trekk og fraksjoner blant disse gruppene styrkes. Samtidig kan det bidra til å gjøre dem mer vennlig innstilt overfor vesten. Dermed vil ikke et eventuelt maktskifte fremstå som en automatisk trussel mot vestlige interesser.

Ingen fred uten Hamas

2008-03-03T11:58:00.000-08:00

De uavbrutte rakettangrepene mot israelske grensebyer har fått Israel til å snakke om å reokkupere Gaza. Israel har tidligere prøvd isolasjon og boikott mot Hamas, bare for å oppleve at angrepene har økt i omfang. Selv israelere tar nå til orde for at man må snakke med Hamas.

Karen AbuZayd, lederen av Fns organisasjon for palestinske flyktninger (UNRWA), peker på at fredsprosessen har liten sjanse til å lykkes dersom det islamistiske Hamas holdes utenfor. Dette er et ekko av hva Fns spesialrapportør for menneskerettigheter i de palestinske områdene, John Dugard, tidligere har uttalt om den såkalte kvartettens politikk overfor Hamas. I følge Dugard bør FN forlate kvartetten, ettersom organisasjonens uforbeholdne støtte til Fatah på bekostning av Hamas skaper en situasjon hvor FN operer som et verktøy for amerikansk politikk. Vesten har egenhendig utpekt Abbas-regjeringen som talsmann for palestinerne, på tross av at Fatah slett ikke vant valget.
Kvartetten, bestående av EU, Russland, USA og FN, stilte tre ufravikelige krav som måtte oppfylles før den nyvalgte Hamasregjeringen kunne godkjennes. Hamas måtte annerkjenne alle avtaler tidligere makthaver Fatah hadde inngått, avslutte alle militære aktiviteter og, fremfor alt, annerkjenne Israels rett til ekstistens. Straffen for ikke å oppfylle disse kravene har vært politisk boikott og økonomiske sanksjoner. Resultatet av disse sanksjonene har blant annet vært at politi og andre statsansatte ikke har fått lønn på måneder, store problemer i helsesektoren, strømmangel og generelt kaos i de palestinske selvstyre-områdene.

Å stille slike krav kan i prinsippet være etisk akseptabelt. I realiteten har imidlertid mangelen på fleksibilitet og vilje til dialog fra kvartettens side overfor Hamas, vist seg å få fatale konsekvenser. Oppfyllelse av kravene ble stilt som betingelse for at dialog mellom Hamas, Israel og det internasjonale samfunn skulle kunne finne sted, og før Hamas hadde rukket å innta regjeringskontorene. Israel fikk i realiteten ingen tilsvarende krav. På hvilken måte virker en slik internasjonal reaksjon på en organisasjon som Hamas?

I perioden før det palestinske valget diskuterte Hamas og det fryktede terror-nettverket al Qaeda gyldigheten av det palestinske valget. Al Qaeda kritiserte Hamas for å delta i demokratiske valg, for på den måten ”å spille vestens spill”. Al Qaeda anerkjenner ikke det de kaller kunstige landegrenser, demokrati er ikke-islamsk og dermed kjettersk, og muslimer som befatter seg med demokrati vil tape i vestens spill.

Med iverksettelsen av Hamasboikotten har al Qaeda på mange måter fått rett. Slik denne grupperingen ser det, har vesten nå med all mulig tydelighet vist hvor grunn den påståtte respekten for demokrati virkelig er. Det virkelig tragiske er at radikale strømninger innen Hamas og blant palestinere generelt har blitt styrket. Sjansen for at disse gruppene nå skal legge ned våpnene eller anerkjenne Israel er minimal.

Dette er stikk i strid med vestens interesser. Hvis vi ønsker å styrke en mer moderat og demokratisk retning innen islam og å svekke den ideologiske støtten aktører som al Qaeda har blant muslimer, må dialog og forhandling til. Dette innebærer også dialog med grupper som enkelte vil betegne som terrorister, men som tross alt tar positive skritt i retning av mer akseptable handlingsformer. Moderate fraksjoner innen en bestemt gruppe styrkes ved å vise at demokratiske prosesser eller fredelige forhandlinger faktisk gir resultater.

Hamas har tidligere vist gradvise tegn til moderasjon, på samme måte som PLO gjorde det i sin tid. Mange har innsett at å gjenerobre hele Palestina er en umulighet. Dette gjenspeiles i Hamas’ krav om en gjeninnføring av grensene fra 1967 mellom de to landene. I prinsippet anerkjenner de med dette Israels eksistens. Som en av Hamas’ politikere har uttalt: ”problemet er ikke Israels eksistens, men at Palestina ikke eksisterer”. Ved en mindre konfronterende linje fra kvartettens side er det ikke urimelig å tro at Hamas gjennom forhandlinger eksplisitt ville anerkjent Israel, vel og merke med grensene fra 1967.

Nå, i et politisk klima preget av borgerkrig og nød, er det de radikale trekkene ved Hamas som styrkes. I tillegg ser vi at enda mer ekstreme grupper i Palestina får stadig flere rekrutter. Politisk isolasjon og humanitær krise fører til mer militante holdninger. Hamas opplever press og isolasjon fra både vesten og Fatah. Forventer man at en ideologisk basert organisasjon som nektes økonomisk støtte og anerkjennelse, og som er truet både internt og eksternt skal legge ned våpnene og innfri alle krav?

Et slikt scenario ville i så fall trolig ha medført tap av all religiøs og ideologisk autoritet. Hamas har ved valget vunnet frem ved å fremstå som ukorrupte, som hellige krigere. De ser på seg selv som som noe av det som hindrer Israel i å sluke det som er igjen av Palestina. Det ville vært politisk umulig å oppfylle de tre kravene under slike forhold uten at Israel oppfylte tilsvarende krav.

Dette har kvartetten visst om på forhånd. I en situasjon der de faktiske konsekvensene ble tatt med i beregningen, ikke bare prinsippene, ville en forsøkt forhandlinger som unnlot å la Hamas tape ansikt. En slik strategi ville sannsynligvis også ha vært i Israels interesse, ettersom et Hamas med ressurser og med autoriteten i behold i større grad ville vært i stand til å få kontroll over de gruppene som nå uavbrutt sender Qassim-raketter mot Israel. Hamas har tidligere vist at de er i stand til å overholde en våpenhvile. Selv under den nåværende krisen har organisasjonen vist tegn til pragmatisme. Løslatelsen av den kidnappede journalisten Alan Johnston er ett eksempel på dette.

Boikotten og den ureserverte støtten til Fatahs kriseregjering vitner om et ønske om å slippe å måtte forholde seg til Hamas. Men skal noe oppnås i denne konflikten kan man ikke unnlate å forholde seg til en av de viktigste partene. Hamas vant valget og representerer det palestinske folk på en måte president Mahmoud Abbas og statsminister Salam Fayyad ikke gjør. Abbas og Fayyad regnes blant mange tvert om for å være amerikanske eller israelske nikkedukker som verken representerer palestinere flest eller har deres tillit. Hvordan skal disse da kunne forhandle på folkets vegne? Hvordan skal Abbas Fayyad få kontroll over radikale utbryter-grupper som betrakter Fatah som Israels løpegutter?

I tillegg har støtten til Fatah blåst liv i den latente maktkampen mellom de to partiene. Under dekke av koalisjonsregjeringen styrket begge sider sine militære apparater, i påvente av en voldelig konflikt. Fatah og Hamas fikk signaler fra vesten om at resultatet av det demokratiske valget ikke trengte å innebære maktskifte. Dermed har vesten nok en gang støttet det som er ett av midtøstens største problemer: de ikke-demokratiske strømningene. De kommer til uttrykk gjennom viljen til å løse politiske konflikter ved hjelp av militære virkemidler.

I dag fremstår det derfor som nærmest en umulighet å skape fred uten Hamas. Vesten bør nærme seg denne gruppen med en pragmatisk og løsningsorientert holdning. Det betyr at en må være villig til å forhandle med Hamas uten å stille krav som i utgangspunktet ikke kan oppfylles fra palestinsk side. Den beste fremgansmåten vil være å tilby Hamas gradvise løsninger som tillater gruppen å innfri krav uten samtidig å tape ansikt. Rimelig nok innebærer dette at også Israel må forplikte seg til å innfri krav fra Hamas, som gjennom demokratiske valg har vunnet retten til å representere det palestinske folk.

Reisebrev fra Iran 2006

2008-01-04T03:22:00.000-08:00

”Please observe the Islamic dress code” står det på et skilt på flyplassen utenfor Tehran. Jeg har forberedt meg godt; i reisebagen har jeg en lang bluse og et sjal som skal fungere som skaut. Flere andre lange bluser ligger i kofferten. Resultatet av denne planleggingen er at jeg føler meg som en sjuske, en umoderne kjærring, en dass. Jentene i Tehran er på ingen måte slik jeg forventet. På grunn av lovene som regulerer kvinners påkledning, er det visse retningslinjer de må følge; lår, rumpe og armer må dekkes, og selvsagt håret. Disse reglene er tøyet til det ugjenkjennelige hos mange av de unge kvinnene jeg ser. Istedenfor den heldekkende chadoren bærer de noe som kalles mantou, et klesplagg som i noen tilfeller ligner på våre tunikaer, i andre tilfeller ligner de blazere eller jakker. Fellesnevneren er at de er innsvingte og trange, og ofte blir båret over piratbukser med tilhørende sandaler og neglelakk på tærne. Sløret sitter gjerne langt bak på hodet, og lange, svarte hårmanker flommer oppsetsig ut fra sløret sett bakfra. Jentene ser feminine og moderne ut, i motsetning til meg. Jeg ligner, til forveksling, på en potetsekk. Noe av det første jeg gjør neste dag er å gå til innkjøp av noen standsmessige og moderne mantoer.

Hvordan forstå Iran? Iran er et land med en ultra-konservativ president som erklærer til alle som vil høre at Israel bør slettes fra verdenskartet. Dette foregår samtidig med at Israel sitter nervøst med fingeren på avtrekkeren og håper på USAs tilatelse til å bombe Irans påståtte atomvåpenfabrikk. Men Iran er også et land med en høyt utdannet og ung befolkning, et land , som ifølge the Economist er det eneste i Midtøsten som graviterer bort fra radikal islamisme, og hvis moderne filmer er internasjonalt annerkjent som kunsteriske innovasjoner. Men denne uken er det martyrenes uke i Iran, som starter på årsdagen for krigen mellom Iran og Irak. Dokumentarfilmene som vises på iransk tv denne uken har neppe vunnet noen internasjonale filmpriser. Akkompagnert av rørende musikk vises blodige soldatstøvler og hjelmer, gjerne med martyrbånd rundt, mens en hvit due flakser i sakte film over det hele. I horisonten synes Ayatholla Khomeinis ansikt. På martyrenes kirkegård, Zaras Paradis, i Tehran er stemningen noe av det samme. Over et skurrende høytaleranlegg spilles noe jeg antar er religiøse hymner. Det spesielle ved denne kirkegården er at alle gravene er utstyrt med glassmontere hvor martyrens familie kan stille ut det de måtte ønske av rekvisitter. I nesten alle finnes det bilder av avdøde; unge gutter og menn. Personlige eiendeler som bønnekjeder, barnesko og hårlokker finnes også. Svært mange av monterene fremviser dessuten bilder av Khomeini, mannen som sendte dem til deres sikre død. Disse unge guttene og barna fungerte som menneskelige minesveipere og kanonføde. På tv intervjues mødrene, som takker for at nettopp deres sønn fikk muligheten til å bli martyr.

Jeg forventer å finne noe av den samme stemningen på Khomeinis gravsted. Men her er atmosfæren mindre trykkende, ja rett ut ganske avslappet. De fleste sitter rolig på gulvet og ber. Noen spiser, noen sover, og barn leker. Rundt Khomeinis kiste er det bygget et slags firkantet helligdom av glass og smijern. Her står kvinnene og ber. Jeg skjønner at dette er svært personlig for dem. Mange gråter eller messer lavt med igjenknepne øyne. Ber de på vegne av seg selv eller sin familie? Ber de om penger eller kur for sykdom, om å få barn, om å slippe flere barn? Eller er det rett og slett Imamens nærvær som frembringer inderligheten? Khomeini var selve bastionsfiguren for revolusjonen som startet i 1978. Denne har siden blitt kalt den islamske revolusjonen, men den startet som de fleste andre revolusjoner; som en kamp mot et undertrykkende regime. Desverre ble også det nye regimet, Khomeinis styre, vel så undertrykkende. Likevel, dette er ikke hele sannheten. Det er sant at Khomeini innførte kjønns-apartheid, at han forfulgte politiske motstandere og at han styrte etter sharia, islamsk lov. Men det er også sant at kvinners leseferdighet mer enn fordoblet seg under Khomeini, at religiøse familier begynte å sende døtrene sine på skolen, og at Imamen ønsket at frie valg på parlament og president skulle finne sted. Det er sant at han dedikerte den diktsamlingen han skrev i sine siste leveår til sin høyt elskede svigerdatter. Senere, ute på gaten, ser jeg en mann som strener gesjeftig bortover fortauet. Foran seg holder han en enorm iskrem som han beskytter mot andre fotgjengeres uforsiktighet. Det er tydelig at iskremen ikke er til ham selv, at han er en mann med et oppdrag. Oppdragets opphav er etter all sannsynlighet en iransk kvinne som har bestemt at hun har lyst på iskrem. Den iranske mann kjenner sin plikt; kvinnen må få sin iskrem. Tidligere har jeg observert en rekke kvinnelige sjåfører manøvrere i trafikken. De hytter med neven, tuter og skriker på lik linje med mennene. Trafikken i Tehran overgår forøvrig selv Kairo på sitt verste. Den amerikanske journalisten Robin Wright har oppsummert Tehrans trafikkregler slik:
1. For å svinge til høyre, legg deg i ytterste venstre fil
2. Sirener betyr at man skal kjøre om kapp med ambulansen eller brannbilen
3. Hvis du glemmer avkjørselen på en travel motorvei, rygg tilbake
4. Alle filer er forbikjørings-filer, både fram og tilbake
5. Rødt lys betyr kjør
6. Tre filer betyr egentlig fire filer, under rush-trafikk betyr det fem.
7. I tung trafikk, ta over filen til motkommende trafikk. Slik blir toveiskjørte veier enveis-kjørte, mens enveis-kjørte som regel er toveis-kjørte.

Lonely Planet har ett råd til fotgjengere som skal krysse veier: safety in numbers. Jeg følger en annen strategi, jeg blir trafikkblind. Jeg strener ut i veien og går i sikk-sakk mellom bilene. Det er bot for å kjøre på folk. Likevel; det er første gang i Midtøsten jeg opplever at en busstur som skal ta fire timer i realiteten tar kun fire timer. Faktisk tar den tre og en halv time. På den annen side; det er også første gang jeg opplever forbikjøring med buss i 120 km I timen.

Iranerne er et ekstremt stolt folkeslag. Deres isolasjon og paria-status i verdenssamfunnet er deres store sorg, noe som fører til en uforstilt glede når de møter vestlige turister som har kommet til akkurat deres land. Man trenger ikke være ensom som turist her hvis man ikke selv ønsker det. Invitasjoner blir gitt uten andre baktanker enn å gjøre turisters opphold så hyggelig som mulig. Man merker gjenklangen av historie, av gammel, gammel kultur. I byen Shiraz ligger restene av det persiske imperium, minnene om den flere tusen år gamle sivilisisasjonen, som på sett og vis fortsatt lever i en hver iraner. Den tyrkiske forfatteren Orhan Pamuk skriver at alle som driver et imperium må lære seg nødvendigheten av kulturell og religiøs toleranse. Det er sant, og den persiske herskeren Cyrus var kanskje den første som tok denne sannheten til hjertet. I alle fall forlangte han ingen religiøs omvendelse eller kulturell uniformering av befolkningen i de land han erobret. Tvert om forsikret han de erobrede om deres rett til å velge selv, noe den iranske fredsprisvinneren Shirin Ebadi påpekte i sin tale under overrekkelsen. Darius den første og hans sønners Persepolis var en gang et enormt kompleks av fantasistiske byggverk. Desverre ble mye rasert da Alexander den store inntok Persia i år 331 f. Kr. I følge legenden er ødeleggelsene et resultat av et gedigent fyllekalas. Fyllekalas eller ei, det som står igjen kan fortsatt fremkalle frysninger på ryggen og klump i halsen. Man kan myse med øynene i sollyset og tenke seg hvordan det var her før. Man kan gå opp trappen som førte til tronen og se på de vakre inngraveringene som forestiller undersåtter fra alle imperiets hjørner. De går opp trappen sammen med deg.

Jeg besøker moskeen Fehayeen. I skyggen sitter to unge jenter i lav samtale med hverandre. Ved hjelp av Lonely Planets lille lommeparlør får jeg stotret frem et spørsmål om hva de snakker om. ”Om Guds storhet” svarer de. Min fantastisk hjelpsomme guide kommer bort, og dermed blir han mellomleddet i en storstilt plan. Det hele fører til at jeg, ikke-muslimen, skal bli med jentene i fredagsbønn. Bønneropene har allerede holdt det gående en stund. Gud setter pris på punktlighet, så nå haster det. Fnisende løper vi inn til kvinnenes vaskerom. Det er tydelig at jentene vil ha meg til å gjøre noe mer enn å vaske hendene, men lommeparløren ligger igjen utenfor. Jeg sliter for å skjønne hva de vil frem til. Den håpløse situasjonen får oss til å le. Flere og flere kvinner strømmer til, snart er vaskerommet fylt av kvinnelatter. Omsider går det opp for meg at det er sminken som er problemet. Man skal møte sin Allah uten tant og fjas. Uheldigvis er sminken min vannfast, jeg får mascaraen i store, svarte ringer rundt øynene. Man skal altså møte sin Allah som pandabjørn. Jentene skjønner at jeg er et håpløst tilfelle, leende leier de meg inn til selve bønnerommet. Etter noen korte forhandlinger får jeg overta en annen kvinnes shador, dette lakenet av et plagg som ingen kan mestre uten år med trening. Til allmenn forlystelse blir jeg stilt forrerst i rekken av kvinner, og jeg skjønner at bakgrunnsarbeidet mitt er mer enn mangelfullt. De faste ritualene, med bøying, kneling og ligging på gulvet, er vanskelig når man ikke kan følge personen foran seg. Jeg har problemer med både shadoren og mitt eget slør som jeg tråkker på hver gang jeg skal reise meg. Omsider er disse ritualene overstått. Jeg sitter i et hjørne og ser på de troende. Det er rørende og merkelig for en sekulær nordmann. Det er også rørende hvordan de uten å nøle slapp meg inn i sitt religiøse fellesskap for en stakket stund. Jeg tenker at både den ene og den andre hadde hatt noe å lære her.

Et iransk måltid foregår ofte på gulvet. Siden jeg har lest at man ikke skal vende forsålene mot noen, bestreber jeg meg på akkurat dette. Etter flere måltid på gulvet må jeg konkludere med at ingen ser ut til å bry seg om fotsålene vender mot, bort fra eller inn i dem. Iranerne bryr seg om det gode måltid, noe flere av dem også bærer preg av med hensyn til kroppsfasong. Hjemme hos iranere bys man som oftest på en av to nasjonalretter i ulike lokale varianter. Fessenjan er kylling stekt i en saus av blant annet granateple-juice og valnøtter. Det smaker nydelig, syrlig og mektig. Den andre retten, abgoushd eller dizi, er en slags gryterett med lam og alle slags grønnsaker. Overalt ellers får man kjøpt kebab. Og vi snakker ikke om norsk kebab her. Dette er nydelig kjøtt av lam, okse eller kjøttdeig grillet på spyd, servert enkelt med krydderet Zoma, yoghurt, lime, rå løk og et tynt brød man kan rulle rundt herligheten. Kjøttet smelter i munnen. Jeg spiser kebab hver dag, jeg er umettelig når det gjelder iransk kebab. Etterpå smaker det godt med en porsjon safran-iskrem eller baghlabah, en søt kake med pistasjnøtter. Er man bare litt sulten kan det friste med ferskpresset fruktjuice med alle tenkelige og utenkelige frukter. Over ett av disse overdådige måltidene sammen med nye iranske venner tar samtalen en alvorlig vending. Medisinstudenten Ali spør meg om hva nordmenn der hjemme egentlig tenker om Iran. Tenker om Iran? Etter litt gåing rundt grøten blir spørsmålet spesifisert: hva tenker nordmenn om Irans atom-politikk? Jeg prøver meg på et diplomatisk svar, men det går tydeligvis ikke helt hjem. Med sorg i stemmen spør Ali meg om hvorfor Israel skal få lov til å ha atomvåpen. Og India og Pakistan og USA og Frankrike og alle de andre. Bare ikke Iran. Jeg mumler noe om ikke-spredning, men da får jeg svar på tiltale; også atommaktene forpliktet seg ved denne avtalen. De skulle ruste ned. Det har de ikke gjort. Istedet har de prøvesprengt, og dessuten invadert to av Irans naboland. Hvordan kan man kreve at andre skal avstå fra noe en selv flotter seg med?

Jeg kommer til Isfahan. Ingenting har forberedt meg på denne byen. Det er først nå jeg skjønner at jeg er i en annen verden. Den er som den har vært de siste hundre årene, men med alt du måtte ønske av av luksusliv. Isfahan er delt i to av en stor elv, som gjør den kjølig, litt som en norsk sommernatt. Og broene er byens kjennetegn. Vakre og orientaliske broer pakkket med masser av mennesker. De spiser iskrem og holder hverandre i hendene eller over hverandres skuldres. For ikke så lenge siden, før president Khatami ble valgt i 1996, var offentlig iskrem-spising forbudt. Slikking av is kunne tydeligvis forbindes med erotiske tungeøvelser. Ting har forandret seg nå. Alt foregår i et bedagelig tempo. Under bruene har de laget cafeer på treplanker over vannet. Folk røyker vannpipe, siterer Hafez og spiller sjakk. .

Jeg stopper på Khomeini Square, en park og bazar omgitt av tre utrolig vakre moskeer. De er eldgamle, stadig påbygget av nye ledere. Små, små porseelensruter utgjør til sammen hele moskeeen. Håndmalte, I vakre farger, hver lille bit er et kunstverk i seg selv. Den søte lukten fra vannpipene duver over det hele.

Oppholdet avsluttes med en tur til den ovenfornevnte Hafez´grav. Hafez var en 1600-talls dikter som nyter en slags popstjerne-status i Iran. Folk valfarter til graven hans. Noen har med seg utgaver av bøkene hans, som så åpnes på en tilfeldig side. Denne sidens innhold er et budskap fra Hafez. Fremfor selve graven hans står en sufiprest. Han virker oppslukt av bønn, men når jeg tilbyr ham noen penger for å kunne ta et bilde av ham, er han raskt fremme med sin lille pengeveske. Det siste jeg ser før jeg drar er at han bøyer seg over graven og kysser den ømt.

What happened to freedom?

2007-11-28T08:44:00.000-08:00

This is an essay I wrote a few years back about the rise and fall of the Iranian reformist movement. It´s a little outdated, but still provides some interesting points.

In defiance to conventional wisdom, the last decade has seen a growing tendency of democratization within certain Islamic movements in the Middle East, in terms of commitment to democratic principles and human rights (Francois Burgat 2002, James Piscatori 2002, Are Knudsen 2003). The movements are known under different names, some of which are reformists, the Islamic left, new Islamists or Islamic democrats. In the 1990s and early 2000, one of these movements could be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here the movement won Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997, 2000 and 2001 by championing democracy and the rule of law. But despite the reformist’s dominance in both the executive and legislative branch, they proved unable to implement any substantial changes. The institutional arrangements are designed to protect the Islamic character of the republic, and through these, elements within the conservative faction of the regime are in the position to overrule any attempt at change. Their fear of reform has spawned a renewed wave of suppression. This has led to a paradoxical situation; by voting for pro-democratic candidates, the population has received less instead of more freedom. It seems that the Iranian people have retreated into a state of political apathy, and the reformist movement is declared dead. What can explain this situation?

This paper seeks to explore new Islamism in Iran, as represented by the reformist movement fronted by former President Mohammad Khatami. The aim is to clarify and discuss the ideological and political battle taking place between the reformist movement and the regime hard-liners. Focus will be on the relationship and interaction between the state, the elite and the civil society. In clear terms, I have four interconnected questions that can be phrased as the following: what triggered the rise of the reformist movement? What challenges did they meet, and what may explain their failure at implementing reform? What are the possible implications following from this experience? By combining elements from transition theory, mobilization theory and certain structural and institutional factors, I hope to generate a few possible answers. The first part will provide a clarification of the term “New Islamism”. This clarification will also place the pro-democratic Iranian movement in an international and historical context. Further on follows a discussion on the relationship between state and society in Iran. This relationship is in large part determined by how the ruling elites perceive the population. Two conflictual conceptions will be introduced, each of them embodied in the Iranian Constitution of 1989 (Brumberg 2001). This Constitution provided the political opportunity structure which allowed for the uniting of the reformist factions, as seen in part five. Structural factors enter the arena when we encounter the alienated civil society further on. Here the potential and mobilization of the Iranian civil society are discussed, as the uniting of reformist elites and the mass results in a democratic movement of great force. This movement prompted a reaction from the hard-line conservatives, which may explain its failure. This will be analyzed in part seven, before turning to what the results of this failure may be.

The Green Democrats
” The real issue is not what Islam is, but what Muslims want. Contemporary Islam is a dynamic phenomenon. It includes not only Bin Laden and the Taliban, but also liberals who are clearly embarking on their own Reformation..” Graham E. Fuller, Foreign Affairs 2002

Fuller’s words provide us with an appropriate opening for this inquiry. In opposition to Samuel Huntington’s "The Clash of Civilization", the religious dogmas of Islam are not treated as static structures, but as subject to various interpretations. As David Beetham points out, not many decades have passed since the Catholic faith was judged incompatible to democracy. The democratic transitions in Southern Europe rapidly disqualified this notion (1999). In contradiction to the many voices proclaiming Islam’s incompatibility with democracy, Islamist movements from around the world are committing themselves to the rule of law and democracy. It seems that the movements have realized that obtaining power through weapons, force and authoritarian means is counter-effective, and that democracy is the best way of generating support for their Islamic message. This may be an effect of both globalization and the fall of the Soviet Union . Through the global media and the new means of communication, people are well aware of events taking place in the rest of the world. The current wave of popular demand for democracy across the Middle East can serve as an example. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War lifted the extreme superpower intervention in the developing countries, thus giving more space to local dynamics. Hence, liberal democracy seemingly remained the only alternative to authoritarian rule. However, that assessment might have come to early. Huntington does have a point when he criticizes Fukuyama on his "end of history" optimism. Global culture has yet to become one homogenous idea system fuelled by Western ideals and values. New Islamism can be read as an attempt to create a third alternative; an Islamic model for democracy. Instead of treating Islam and democracy as contraries, the combining of the two can perhaps lead to a broader and more substantial democratic movement. Installing democratic institutions are futile if the institutions lack meaning for the citizens. In certain countries and within certain segments, Islam has proved to be a powerful force in uniting citizens against supressive regimes. Further more, it has also become a tool through which actors can voice their misgivings and demands for change. Although a so-called "Islamic" model of democracy is not without its complications, Islam's role as a source of mobilization and democratic learning should not be underestimated.

Different Shades of Gray
The President and Parliament in Iran are chosen through democratic elections. But the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei) and the Council of Guardians (where the Supreme Leader indirectly chooses the members) oversee these institutions. Together with the judiciary (also indirectly chosen by Khamenei) they form a “second tier” of government institutions that stand above the democratic ones. They are designed to ensure the religious character of the Sharia -ruled state. This stems from Khomeini’s concept of the velayat-e faqih (rule by the religious expert). The velayat-e faqih has been interpreted to mean that the religious authorities, with the Supreme Leader at the front, have the last word and ultimate authority. This is deemed necessary on account of the need to interpret the Koran and the Sunnah in the right way. And the right to define what ”the right way” consists of is reserved strictly for the members of the clergy. By making Islam, the source of political authority, into an esoteric knowledge inaccessible to the common man, the state itself is removed from the democratic grasp of the people (Beetham 1999: 97).

The velayat-e faqih in its current form points to a conception of the people which I call” the community of lambs”. The term implies that the people are ”lambs” in need of guidance and protection from the many onslaughts to the true faith. They are themselves incapable of knowing what is in their own interest, and have a duty (as faithfuls) to obey the religious authorities. Thus, the relationship between the state and the society can be described as the relationship between the shepherd and his flock of lambs . While states ultimately are forms of domination, this kind of domination drastically limits the interaction between state and society. By this I mean the kind of reciprocal influence inherent in substantial democracies. Here, the civil society influences the domination of the state not only through elections, but also through associations, organizations, culture, media and economic activities. Paternalistic states, on the other hand, seek to minimalize influence from the population by controlling the sphere between the state and the individual: the civil society.

For many years the elections for President and Majlis (Parliament) have functioned as a democratic facade; the Council of Guardians ultimately determines who will be allowed to run for election. Candidates who are judged to lack ”the necessary loyalty to Islam, the Republic and the Supreme Leader” are barred from participating (Bouromand and Bouromand 2001). Still, the Council’s right to exercise this control is contested. To quote the Islamic left-winger Khoeyniha: ” God (..) has given the people the right to form a government, for their society to choose a ruler ( Salam 24 July 1995). As would be apparent, this implies a very different interaction between state and society: the power of the state stems from the people as citizens. This democratic ideal can be conceptualized as ”the community of citizens” who, in clear opposition to ”the community of lambs”, embodies the liberal notion of individuals with both the right to, and the capacity for, self-determination. Iran’s population is therefore conceived of as both lambs and citizens. Daniel Brumberg calls this the politics of ”dissonance”, ”because it points not to a coherent system but rather to the deliberate and uneasy linking of competing notions of political community.” (2003: 146).

The struggle between the reformists and the conservatives is in more than one sense a struggle to determine which of the two notions of political community shall dominate. But the situation is not as simple as one may think. Instead of a clean-cut division between hard-liners and soft-liners, we have multiple divisions, ranging from secularists vs. Islamists, moderates vs. militants and religious conservatives vs. religious liberals. The Second of Khordad Front embodied nearly all of these divisions. Thus, it was a fragile coalition. The following part explores what factors and orientations brought the coalition together in the first place

Coming Together: The Second of Khordad Front
The 1989 reform of the Constitution opened the door to reformers who espoused a more liberal view of Islam. Drawing on Tarrow’s work on the opening of authoritarian systems, the reform created a change in the political opportunity structure (1998) Ten years had passed since the revolution, but the debate about what kind of Islamic community one wanted was not settled. The process of routinization of charismatic power had begun, with the charismatic leader himself, Imam Khomeini trying to find ways to institutionalize his power.

The reform of the constitution was intentionally designed to create a certain amount of tension, by dividing the power between the faqih, the Majlis and the President. According to Daniel Brumberg, this stems from Khomeini`s conclictual view on clerical rule; by controlling everything, the clergy would also be responsible for everything that went wrong. Thus, democratically elected powerholders would share the responsibility, and thereby also the blame, for social problems. In this way the clergy would not compromise their credibility by exceeding their own limits (2001: 117)

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected President 1989 through a managed election common to this period (Ansari 2003: 243). Despite being a liberal in the economic sense, his veiws on political and civil freedoms were conservative. Still, he was in favour of, in Brumberg’s words, ”a cultural mini-glasnost” and through this, the strengthening of civil society. Rafsanjani`s Minister of Islamic Guidance, Seyyid Mohammad Khatami, sparked a revival of the Iranian film industry by easing the restrictions laid on artists. The crack-down from the conservatives came in 1992. The Majlis were purged of the ”radical” elements, and Khatami resigned, refusing to be part of the destruction of the state. Intellectuals like Abdul Karim Soroush and Abbas Abdi were verbally and physically attacked, and media companies that had received their licences from Khatami were banned. But instead of beating to the ground these new and dangerous trends, the crack-down spurred a uniting of different liberal factions who otherwise would not have found common ground (Brumberg 2001: 186-189). These “children of the revolution” now started questioning the nature of the state they themselves helped to create. Among these were Abbas Abdi, one of the leaders of the radical student organization behind the seizure of the US embassy in 1979, and Sourosh, a “secularist” advocating the separation of state from religion. Khatami, in his turn an important ally of Khomeini`s, believed that democracy could be achieved through the existing system. Despite the myriad of different factions, the crack-down served to unite them. Many of these would eventually form the Second of Khordad Front, named after the date Khatami was elected President.

Being supporters of the Islamic Republic, Khatami, Souroush and the others watched with growing concern how the state had managed to alienate a generation of individuals born after the revolution. One of the necessary conditions for regime opening, that of tensions within the regime, was quickly becoming more visible. Thus, the simplified but useful distinction between regime hard-liners and soft-liners can be made at this point (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986). It is also possible to claim that the alienated civil society itself created, or at least furthered, these regime tensions. While the hard-liners saw no reason to change the system, Khatami, Ayathollah Montazeri and others viewed things differently. Khatami warned that without reform the whole system could come crashing down in the face of the growing disenchantment of the people. How could the Republic be saved? It is possible to claim that this very question is echoed throughout the Middle East: the waning legitimacy of state authority makes it paramount to find a way of generating renewed support. For Khatami and his circle the answer was to democratize the existing system. This meant fewer restrictions and more autonomy to the public, increased protection of human rights and the spread of tolerance and pluralism within the state administration. Furthermore, Khatami took as his point of departure Soroush’ idea of an “Islamic civil society”. By opposing the clerical monopoly on interpreting Islam, Soroush was advocating a shift from ”the community of the lambs” towards that of the citizens. Through the active participation of redefining and applying Islam, the population will endorse the religion and reject the cultural onslaught from the West. Khatami argued that this rejection could no longer be achieved through suppressive methods. Dictated by the global context, one had to strive for an open dialogue between all members of society. In the conservative newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Khatami, when asked about the role of the clergy, states that ” society should rely on all the people and not only the elite because this elite may deviate from the correct path”. For while ” relying on religious leadership is necessary, it is not sufficient ” (February 1997). ”All members” also include those that are not Muslims, as tolerance and pluralism are important factors in the Islamic civil society (Khatami 1995: 45).

Waking Up the Neighbourhood: The People Arise from Apathy
One important condition a repressive regime relies on for survival in the face of a dissatisfied public, is the separation, or delinking, of the elites from the mass (or the parties from their constituencies). Prohibiting opposition leaders from mobilizing the masses is essential for the continued legitimacy of the regime, a safeguard against mass upheavals and demands for change ( Brumberg 2003: 147 ). In this process it seems the ruling clerical elite has succeeded only too well in cutting themselves off from society. The well-educated population of Iran is young; 70 percent are under 30 years. According to various sources they are for the large part ” de-islamized”; they neither fast nor attend Friday prayer . In 1997 the regime faced a grave crisis of legitimacy. In the universities, the regime had been forced to hire Western-educated staff for lack of other qualified teachers. This ensured that an important institution of ideological control was not totally in the hands of the hard-liners. Teachers inspired by Western ideas about rule of law and democracy were allowed, by default, to influence the students (Brumberg 2001: 189). During Khomeini’s rule the literacy rate had more than doubled, especially dramatic was the female literacy rate. Half of the population was born after the revolution; they had never experienced Khomeini’s charismatic leadership, but instead encountered a state that failed to provide them with political and economical opportunities. Widespread higher education combined with economic stagnation furthered demands for more influence in politics. In addition to the growing middle class it also existed a relatively large class of capitalist entrepeneurs. In a state characterized by “crony capitalism”, dissatisfaction from those that are shut out from the economy is likely to arise. The potential for collective action was heightened by urbanisation. The structural setting bears connotations to both Barrrington Moore Jr`s bourgeois-led path to democracy and modernisation theory’s middle class-led development. Both factors are there; a large and vigorous middle class combined with limited political rights and a stagnated economy . For this reason, Western observers viewed Iran as one of the countries most likely to democratize in the near future (The Economist, January 2001).

But participation in elections remained low, and several sources reported about widespread political indifference in 1995 . This may have prompted the regime to allow Khatami to run for presidency. By letting a reform-minded soft-liner participate, they hoped to strengthen the impression of real elections with real alternatives. In this way the regime might generate more legitimacy and support. Their decision had unanticipated results: it managed to unite the reformist elites with the masses, creating a vigorous democratic movement. Guillermo O’Donnel and Phillippe Schmitter call this the ”resurrecting of civil society”. This may happen when certain ”exemplary” individuals voice the misgivings of the population, thus stimulating the populations political re-awakening (1986: 48-52).

The force the numerous student organizations embraced Khatami with an enthusiasm that may have proved frightening to the establishment. Despite being a member of the clergy himself, his message of democracy, reform and pluralism resonated in the crowds. Reform was no longer an intellectual exercise among the elites, but a very real option being celebrated in the streets, the reformist newspapers, television-shows, university campuses and Iranian living-rooms. Women and veiled school-girls could be seen handing out pamphlets and discussing with passers-by in cars and on foot. Mass-meetings were organized and democratic slogans were shouted in loud-speakers. Daniel Brumberg writes: ”In a country were the minimum voting age was sixteen, this explosion of enthusiasm among the young had profound, if not revolutionary, implications” (2001: 224).

But not only the young were involved. In seeing the support Khatami’s message generated, the disillusioned co-founders of the revolution gained courage. They consisted of not only Khatami’s generation, but also the ”grandfathers” of revolution. Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih had been contested among the clerics from the start, but the dissidents had either been silenced or remained calm in fear of being persecuted. Now respected clerics like Ayatollah Montazeri went out in public criticising the lack of democracy, through this lending his authority to the reformists. Thus, the movement managed to unite both ”fathers, children and grand-children” of the revolution (Brumberg 2001) As stated, Khatami won by overwhelming majority, taking his reformist brothers and sisters with him in the following Majlis-election. For many, both Iranians and Western observers, this was believed to be the first stirring of a movement towards democracy. Why was this movement stalled?

What Happened to Freedom?
The Second of Khordad Front’s powerlessness vis-à-vis the conservatives has shown that the prospect of democratic change in Iran ultimately boils down to the need to curb the powers of the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians. This appeared to be a tricky issue for Khatami. On the surface, he seemed reluctant to support his own constituency in the face of regime violence, and his repeated calls to remain calm, was interpreted by many as proof of his less-than-authentic wish to reform the state.

The first crack in the relationship between the reformist elite and the masses came in 1999. Reacting to the students support for Khatami, conservative legislators passed a bill that established a Basij in every university throughout Iran (payvand.com). A Basij is an Islamic student association designed to monitor political activity in the universities. As a response, the students organized massive demonstrations that were brutally beaten down. Many student leaders were murdered, and a mass of others arrested (and still remain imprisoned). The reformist politicians failed to come to the students ail, but supported instead the secret trials and the televised ”confessions” from the alleged ”riot” leaders. Khatami promoted patience and what he called ”active calm”. While claiming to look for justice, he accepted the show trials that found a handful of police officers guilty of misconduct. Afterwards, the student movement split in two, one part refusing to take part in official politics, the other part continuing to support Khatami. But all of the reformists key reform bills have been stopped by the Council of Guardians, from those trying to strengthen women’s rights to those seeking to curb the Councils powers. This has been accepted by the moderate reformists. There may also be a split in the Second of Khordad Front itself. After the banning of more than 3000 reformist candidates prior to the 2004 Majlis election, the faction led by Khatami’s brother called for a boycott, while Khatami and others warned against it. Thus, it is possible to make a distinction between moderate and more radical reformists. It seems that most Iranians now feel betrayed by the moderate Khatami ; he promised them freedom, and he failed to deliver.

The contradictions between the velayat-e faqih and democracy are complicated matters, and require a religio-philosophical approach to be properly exhausted . While this is beyond the scope of this enquiry, other approaches can be applied with interesting results. Khatami may have believed that he really could change the system from within, without changing the existing power structure. But the situation is more complicated than that. From a standpoint of transition theory, reformers in Iran face a difficult challenge: they must further the hopes of the liberal part of the population without creating a significant backlash from the conservative hard-liners. This is a challenge facing all reformers of authoritarian systems who have not undergone radical revolutions (Carothers 1987). The conservatives control the Judiciary, the Revolutionary Guard, a paramilitary volunteer branch, and the Hezbollah, an armed civil organization functioning as the”morals police”. Sourosh and several others have been physically attacked or sentenced to death, students have been brutally murdered and dissidents jailed. In addition, the reformers still have the memory of their last attempt at reforms, which ended with the 1992 crack-down.

Schmitter likens such a situation to a game of chess. While playing the” democratic game”, players are under the constant threat of having the board kicked aside by non-democratic actors who watch from the sideline (1986: 65). The trick is clearly to avoid upsetting the hard-liners. In game-theoretic terms, it is possible that Khatami chose to cloak his real symphaties by appearing to side with the conservatives against his radical supporters during conflicts. Following this line, Khatami could also be in possession of more information than the others. By calling for patience and ”active calm”, by not supporting demonstrations and sit-ins, he may have avoided further bloodshed. It is beyond my capacity to guess what would had happened if the reformers had refused to accept Khamenei and the Council’s rulings, but two scenarios comes to mind. In the face of massive public uprising, the conservatives could have answered by letting loose the military and police forces on the population. It could soon generate into a brutal dictatorship. In the other scenario the regime would have decided against unleashing violence or the military would refuse to open fire, either case most likely resulting in regime break-down. Khatami has strived to avoid either one of these scenarios. He has never claimed to be a Gorbachev. Among the break-away student factions there is even talk of the whole hard-liner, soft-liner conflict being staged just to save the regime.

System Failure
Khatami’s reform agenda could have been more successful if he had managed to talk the hard-liners into accepting the necessity of reform. His fault lies in his faith in the ultimate wisdom of the religious authorities, trusting them to make the right decision. They did not. Many argue that this has proven beyond doubt that the velayat-e faqih in its current form is incompatible with democracy. The system is simply "input-resistant". In my opinion, the regime has emerged from the situation in a worsened state. Seen from a standpoint of negotiated transitions, the regime has not acted wisely, but instead demonstrated the need to remove them altogether. As a result, regime opposition has emerged as more radical than when it entered 1997. The goal is no longer reform, but radical transformation. The experience has also strengthened the extent of regime tension and factionalism, and through this increased its weakness. Even the mainstream soft-liners may prove to be radicalized, as Khatami’s harsh statements about conservative elements points to (aljazeera.com, Salam 24.04 2005). The intellectuals advocating the separation of church and state call themselves the Reformation movement. By announcing the death of the reformist movement and the advent of a new, they have taken the opposition to a new, more radical stage. Some call for a national election that should let the people´s choice determine the religious or secular nature of the state. The Reformation movement has yet to generate the popular upsurge Khatami did. But although the Iranians are disillusioned, the reform movement may yet prove

Learning Democracy
The disappointment following from Khatami’s failure and the hard-liner crack-down have demobilized the Iranian people. By retreating back into the private sphere they are reacting to the state’s intrusionary character. This “disengagement” from the state is a defensive strategy used by the civil society in many authoritarian regimes (Shue and Kholi1994:315). Further more, it is an event often seen following a period of intense popular mobilization . Popular movements fade away due to fatigue, repression or disillusionment (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986: 48).

None the less, the events around The Second of Khordad Front demonstrated that democracy has an enormous potential for mobilization in Iran. While the revolution in 1978-79 was powered by anger, the campaigns in 1997 and 2001 were fuelled by the happy anticipation of freedom. The notion of the community of citizens has suffered a fierce attack, but for a few glorious moments it existed in a very real sense during the campaigns in 1997, 2000 and 2001. From a more pessimistic view the hard-liners have succeeded in separating the opposition elite from the mass, by rendering the opposition powerless to implement what they promised, thereby generating disappointment. But still, it can be argued that the experience has been a process of democracy ”learning” in which elite and mass acted together in pursuit of a common goal. An array of different opinions were for a brief moment aired, discussed and promoted in a show of the most vigorous civil society imaginable. Ramin Jahanbegloo, an Iranian intellectual, writes that one of the most important effects have been “the spread of the language of democracy, not only among the young but throughout the population generally—no mean feat for a country with so long-established a tradition of authoritarianism (Journal of Democracy volume 14, number 1 2003: 128). Thus, the period from 1997 to around 2003 can be seen as an “educational campaign” in which the idea of democracy may have taken even stronger root in even larger segments of the population than previously. The bonds established between the democratic elites and the citizens might prove to be easy to revive, as well as the political identities of the activists. Previous experience with democracy, as well as democratic activity through associations, are known to be constructive for later democratic consolidation (Liv Tørres 2004:2). Dead or not, The Second of Khordad Front have left an imprint on the Iranian society.

Conclusion: Years of Struggle, Years of Growth
Several factors contributed to the rise of the reformist movement in Iran. As we saw in part two, “The Green Democrats”, both global and regional factors have contributed to what may prove to be an ideological shift within Islamist movements. On an institutional level, the Revolutionary Constitution created tensions between the elected government and the powerful institutions ruled by the clergy. In part three, I argued that these two different governments points to two competing conceptions of how the state should relate to the society. An analysis of the basic values informing the velayat-e faqih underlined this: the superior knowledge of the clergy commands obedience from the community of lambs. In contrast, the elected government depends on the accept from the capable and sovereign community of citizens.

The reform of the Constitution in 1989 opened the door to regime dissidents who saw the need to curb the clerical powers in favour of a more democratic society. The already existing tensions within the regime became more pronounced after a crack-down from the conservatives. This crack-down, as argued in part four, seems to have helped the otherwise divided dissidents to find common ground, and ultimately to unite behind Mohammad Seyid Khatami as Presidential candidate in 1997. By this time, the regime faced growing dissatisfaction from the Iranian people. A dramatic increase in birth-rates had created a society where 70 percent of the population were under 30 years. Urbanization, growing literacy and widespread higher education had made this generation into a highly critical and sophisticated crowd. In addition, a stagnated economy characterized by nepotism and corruption offered few opportunities. Part five tried to show how these structural factors contributed to the regime`s substantial lack of legitimacy, and therefore may have prompted the conservative Council of Guardians to let Khatami run for presidency. Khatami’s platform of democracy, reform and rule by law was embraced by large parts of the population, thereby uniting the elite and mass in a powerful reformist movement. But despite having the majority in both the executive and legislative branch, Khatami and his reformist allies encountered obstacles in the form of institutional (un)balance, as described in “What Happened To Freedom?”. The institutional powers of the faqih Ayatholla Khamenei and the Council of Guardians allowed them to veto any bills from the Majlis they judged to be contrary to Islam and the Constitution. Through their control over the judiciary, the police and the armed forces, the regime hard-liners orchestrated a new crack-down. This resulted in the closing of newspapers, arrestations, trials, violence and murders. The delicate balance between generating change and provoking a crack-down from hard-liners is a challenge facing most reformers in authoritarian systems. Following from this, it is possible to argue that Khatami was trying to avoid further bloodshed and suppression by calling for calm and patience from his agitated supporters.

The reformist politicians failure at actually implementing reform can perhaps be explained by the above. But what are the consequences following from this failure? The long-term results are hard to predict, but as stated in “System Failure”, several factors indicate that the regime opposition has been radicalised by the event. Although they are wary of violent confrontations, dissidents stress the need to dramatically alter the system. But will the Reformation movement manage to remobilize the population? The regime has clearly emerged with even less legitimacy than it started out with. Although the Iranians appear to be in a state of political apathy, I argue that the spread of democratic ideas during the reformist movement’s heyday have created a potential for remobilization. If and when this potential will be realised, remains to be seen.

"Terrorists don't simply die for a cause"

2007-11-25T09:17:00.000-08:00

As an article in the NY Times points out, social milieu is important when explaining why some choose to become suicide bombers. Because of the occurrence of 9/11, explanatory theories are in abundance: some focus on poverty, others on alienation, while others again stress the importance of ideology and brainwashing. In truth, the explanation is not likely to be uni-causal, nor must one reason explain the motives of all suicide bombers. Still, one is slowly realizing the importance of group mentality when terrorists are recruited and, in some cases, defect from terrorism. As the Norwegian scientist Tore Bjørgo has found when trying to get extremists of every colour to defect from their militant beliefs and organizations: they join or disengage in groups. So, it makes a lot of sense when anthropologist Scott Atran explains to NY Times correspondent Andrea Elliot that "Terrorists don't simply die for a cause. They die for each other".

That terrorist bombers need not be lone wolves or social misfits is not so surprising when one thinks about it. What makes people go to the step of actually killing other people? Most, if not all, human beings are dependent on some kind of reassurance from the outside world that their conception of reality is correct. You cannot maintain certain beliefs without external ratification. In other words, individual beliefs, whether mundane or spiritual, need to be reinforced from other sources than oneself. In a social milieu that is gradually radicalizing, chances are that you are radicalizing along with it.

As I see it, terrorism is a question of what kind of reality you live in. The reality in which bombing a train is not only justified, but also highly admirable, is a reality where there is war, injustice, a totally unacceptable world order. This is not necessarily a correct conception of reality, but to some, it is the truth.

I like to think about terrorism in terms of the movie "The Matrix". If I believed the world to be a machine-controlled hellhole where humans only exist as energy-sources for machines, I would probably be okay with killing any being that got in my way of liberating the whole of mankind, because anyone not yet liberated, is potentially an agent (literally, as the agents can transform into any which person you meet on the street). This conception of the world order may not be far from how the jihadis view the world. They might see the world as just as inhuman, nightmarish and cruel as in the movie. Remember, in their world, they are the good guys. However, to keep up this belief, they need to be surrounded by peers with corresponding beliefs. Therefore, terrorists don’t just die for each other, but because of each other.
Read more:

NY Times

Finally a sensible move

2007-03-21T10:55:00.000-07:00

The Norwegian deputy foreign minister was the first European to meet with Hamas officials since the new Palestinian government was approved. Raymond Johansen met with Ismael Haniyeh on Monday. Now, there are signs that Sweden is on the move. Swedish minister Carl Blidt is on his way down to the Middle East, specifically to meet with the new government. Mr Blidt will be the first minister from a EU country to show his support for the coalition. Israel however, is disappointed that Europe seems to be abandoning the boycott.

Norwegian scholar Hilde Henriksen Waage speculates that the Norwegian government has been given an unofficial go-ahead from the US. It is unlikely that foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre would have risked the relationship to America in order to back Palestine. Henriksen Waage says that Condolezza Rice seems to acknowledge that there will be no peace without diplomacy. As such, US-friendly Norway might function as a broker between the US/Israel and the PA.

Whichever the case, Norway, Sweden and potentially the rest of Europe, might be in a position to further Israel's interests much better than Israel and the US are capable of. The two latter are fronting a totally unrealistic strategy, which predicts that a boycott will get Hamas thrown out of office, and then everything will be so much better. Like any lasting peace agreement or cease-fire could ever happen without Hamas participating. And like isolation and economic crisis have ever mellowed any government, organization or party. Not to mention the extreme arrogance in Israel and the US trying to dictate who the Palestinians should be governed by..

Fatah and Hamas reach agreement

2007-03-15T13:30:00.000-07:00

Finally, after months of factional fighting on street level and failure to agree on elite level, Hamas and Fatah have reached an agreement on how to allocate the government posts between them. Not surprisingly, it was the position as minister of interior that posed the greatest challenge to the would-be coalition goverment. The new government will be presented for a parliamentary vote of confidence on Saturday, which is expected to be approved. Ismael Haneya, the acting prime minister from Hamas, says that president Mahmoud Abbas has already accepted the candidates, according to al Jazeera. Meanwhile, Israel does not budge. They will not deal with the Palestinian government unless it agrees to the "three principles" of recognizing Israel, denounce violence and abode by previous peace agreements. Despite this, European countries are making signs to indicate that they will now lift the boycott in order to help restore law and order in the Palestinian territories. If the boycott is lifted, Hamas and Fatah still have to heal the wounds after the violent clashes between their supporters. Also, uniting Hamas' Executive Force with the national security apparatus, which is dominated by Fatah, represents a big challenge facing the incoming government. See also previous post "Placing the right demands" for more or

al Jazeera

Religion med politiske motiver

2007-03-11T11:47:00.000-07:00

Spørsmålet er om ikke islam i mange tilfeller brukes til å legitimere udåder som gisseldrap, heller enn å være årsaken til det. Dette er et spesielt viktig punkt når man behandler undertrykkende muslimske regimer. Aktører som undertrykker i islams navn kan ha mange personlige motiver, og de trenger ikke være religiøse, skriver Celine Schiøtt Razavi, student ved Institutt for sammenlignende politikk, Universitetet i Bergen.

DET INTERNASJONALE SAMFUNNS største utfordringer ligger i Midtøsten. Å hjelpe frem stabile samfunn i de krigsherjede landene Irak, Afghanistan og Israel/Palestina, samt å forhindre utvikling av atomvåpen i land som Iran, har både et sikkerhetspolitisk og et humanistisk perspektiv.

Stabilitet i denne regionen har implikasjoner for beboerne i regionen selv, og for resten av verden i form av mindre terrortrussel. Her har Vesten et stort ansvar, ikke minst for å avslutte det som ble påbegynt. Til tross for massiv vestlig motstand mot Irak-krigen kan ikke oppgaven forlates halvgjort, om utgangspunktet var aldri så galt.
Men Irak og de andre landene preges av religiøs motstandskamp, gisseltagning og terrorisme. Forklaringen det blir vist til er islam, med sine påståtte doktriner som avviser demokrati og menneskerettigheter. De vantro amerikanernes tilstedeværelse i hellige byer og på islamsk territorium fungerer som en provokasjon for hellige krigere.

Mer på:

Aftenposten

The war on bloggers

2007-03-09T10:57:00.000-08:00

According to the Arabist, the Egyptian Judge Abdel Fattah Morad is planning to file a lawsuit to get 21 Egyptian blogs and websites blocked. This is also the same judge who will hear the appeal of Abdul Kareem Suleiman, the jailed blogger, next week. He was sentenced to four years in jail in February, three for offending Islam, and one for offending Mubarak. If the judge is successful in his demands, it will subsequently make it easy for the regime to get rid of political dissenters airing their views on the internet. Among the alleged offending webpages are Kefaya's website, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Info and Bent Masreyya. Read more on the Arabist, arabist.net

Placing the right demands

2007-02-26T08:35:00.000-08:00

Having finally managed to create a coalition government with Fatah, Hamas is still not able to end the boycott. By recognizing and swearing to respect previous agreements the Fatah-governed PA (Palestinian Authority) has consented to, Hamas is implicitly recognizing Israel. This is not good enough for Mr. Bush and Mrs. Rice. They are demanding that Hamas explicitly recognize Israel and formally swears off violence. While (at least some) European politicians seem to realize that this is as good as it gets, the US wants a total renunciation of the Hamas platform. Besides its social networks and charity programs, Hamas' support draws in large part from its continuous effort to liberate Palestine. In reality, it's not the whole of Palestine Hamas wants, but Palestine with the 1948 boarders. At least that's what they say, but there are factors that point to their willingness to accept the 1967 boarders. If Western politicians had paid more attention, they would have known that Hamas has shown an increasing sense of pragmatism in terms of accepting the existence of Israel. Like one Hamas official phrased it: "It is not the existence of Israel that is the problem, but the fact that Palestine does not exist".

Ideological parties like Hamas rely heavily on anti-Israel rhetoric. When negotiating with such actors, one should place demands that are not impossible to comply with. By demanding that Hamas, with martyrs-band in hand and bowed heads, renounce what they see as legitimate resistance to occupation, one is simultaneously demanding that they give up their ideological credibility. The result might be an array of out-of-control splinter groups who answer to no one, and who have no incentives to listen to outside opinions. This is the beauty of political participation: when actors like the PLO and Hamas start running for elections and gathering votes, they become more vulnerable and sensitive to the opinions of the general population. Instead of ideological inflexibility, vote-gatherers are forced to compromise and make concessions in order to stay in the game. One can imagine that disillusioned splinter-groups like, say, ´The Real Hamas´, will be sponsored with money from Iran or some "pocket-jihadi" Saudi prince, and as such be more or less independent of the Palestinian society. Having no need for Palestinian votes or money, they would operate regardless of regular people's wishes, battling for "the higher cause" of annihilating the Zionist occupier. Such isolation often translates into hardcore fanaticm and general lack of critical sense. Israel would most probably demand that Hamas reign in these groups before any negotiations could take place, but Hamas would no longer have the power to do so. Gaza might be governed by an even greater degree of lawlessness than now, and be a great place for terrorist-recruitment. In short, it would be al Qaeda's wet dream.

With regard to al Qaeda, Western policy makers should have noticed the war of words between Hamas and al Qaeda. Hamas was accused of compromising its Islamist identity by participating in "infidel" democratic politics. Muslims cannot win playing "their" (Westerners') game. When the boycott was implemented, al Qaeda said: "told you so". Funny how things play right into bin Laden's hands.

If the goal is a de-militarized and moderate Hamas, one should let them off with this implicit recognition of Israel. They have made a concession that lets them keep their face. Forcing them to lose credibility is in no-one's interest, least of all Israel's. Pressing for a formal recognition will either lead to that, or more likely a total rejection from Hamas' side, consequently bringing them closer to Iran. Hamas will not lay down their guns without any major concessions on Israel's side. It is a demand Hamas cannot accept. A cease-fire would be more realistic, and more likely to succeed. But it seems like neither Bush nor Israel is that concerned with success. They are perhaps more than happy to continue the boycott.

Mubarak and al Azhar strike back

2007-02-25T10:35:00.000-08:00

Abdel Kareem Suleiman, an Egyptian blogger, got sentenced to four years in prison. It was the government sponsored Islamic universtity of al Azhar who took the initiative to press charges against him. Apparently, his accusation against al Azhar of suppressing free thought was too much of an insult to ignore. In addition to naming al Azhar "the university of terrorism", Mr Suleiman criticized Hosni Mubarak's dictatorial politics. The result: three years for insulting Islam, and one year for insulting Mr Mubarak. Al Azhar and Mubarak have done a great job clearing their names of any suspicions of suppressing the freedom of expression. Dictator, who me?